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OPINION  
 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Yagendra Tilija appeals a final order of 
removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” 
or “Board”), which denied his motion to remand and dismissed 
his appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  
For the following reasons, we will grant Tilija’s petition for 
review, conclude as a matter of law that the new evidence Tilija 
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submitted established a prima facie asylum claim, and remand 
for further proceedings.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 Tilija is a Nepali native and citizen who was charged 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(i)(I) and applied for 
asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“the Act”) and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1  Tilija joined the 
Nepali Congress Party (“NCP”) in 2013, which is the political 
rival of the Maoist Party.  Tilija campaigned on behalf of the 
NCP by attending meetings, putting up posters, participating in 
rallies, distributing pamphlets, and canvassing door-to-door.  
Maoists told Tilija to join their party and warned him not to 
participate in the election.  On an occasion where Tilija was 
campaigning for the NCP, a group of Maoists attacked him, 
throwing stones at Tilija and injuring his face above his right 
eye and along the side of his face, resulting in six stitches.  
Maoists came to Tilija’s home and told his father that if they 
saw Tilija, they would kill him.  When Tilija was discharged 
from the hospital, he stayed at a hotel instead of going to his 
home in the village due to this threat.  
 Tilija, feeling unsafe, moved to Pokhara, a town four 
hours away from his home.  When he reached Pokhara, 
Maoists called him and told him that the y would kill him the 
                                                 
1 Although Tilija seeks, in addition to asylum, withholding of 
removal and CAT relief in his motion to remand, we conclude 
that he establishes a prima facie case for asylum.  Therefore, 
we need not address these alternate forms of relief.  See 
Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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next time they found him.  A month later, Maoists called Tilija 
again, telling him to leave the NCP and warning him that if he 
did not, they would kill him.  Maoists called a third time, telling 
Tilija that if he came back to his village, they would kill him.  
One day, an individual who Tilija knew to be a Maoist activist 
visited the store where Tilija was working, and though the 
individual did not say anything, Tilija became afraid and 
decided to quit his job and leave Pokhara.   
 Tilija then moved to Kathmandu.  Approximately a 
month later, a Maoist called him and again threatened to kill 
him, at which point Tilija stopped using his cell phone.  Tilija 
remained in Kathmandu for a year, until an earthquake 
destroyed the house he was renting, after which Tilija lived in 
a tent for a month, afraid to return home to his village.  There 
were strikes and protests against the government throughout 
the country, and Tilija did not feel safe from the Maoists amidst 
the chaos, so he decided to leave Nepal.  Tilija observed that 
many members of the police were affiliated with Maoists, and 
according to Tilija, the police did not investigate crimes 
committed by Maoists.  Therefore, Tilija did not report the 
Maoists’ attack on him or any of their threats to the police 
because he believed that the police would not be able to protect 
him.  He had observed previously that the police did not 
investigate when Maoists murdered his cousin’s father-in-law.  
He was also afraid that if he went to the police, the Maoists 
would find out and retaliate.    
 The IJ denied Tilija’s application for asylum and 
withholding of removal under the Act and the CAT.  The IJ 
found Tilija to be credible regarding his claim and found that 
Tilija adequately corroborated his claim with evidence.  The IJ 
also found that Tilija was targeted for his political opinion.  
However, the IJ determined that the harm Tilija suffered did 
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not rise to the level of persecution under the Act and that Tilija 
did not establish that the government was unable or unwilling 
to protect him.   
 On appeal to the BIA, Tilija presented new evidence 
that was not available previously.  According to Tilija, after his 
merits hearing on January 6, 2017, his wife was assaulted and 
raped on January 21, 2017, because of his political activities, 
opinion, and affiliation with the NCP.  Tilija’s wife provided a 
letter for submission to the BIA, noting she “went to [a] nearby 
police office and reported the incident.”  JA 357.  She also 
submitted medical records of an abortion and treatment in a 
clinic following the assault and rape.  Mrs. Tilija also provided 
letters from individuals in Nepal, including one from a friend 
who corroborated that Tilija and his wife have both been 
victims of Maoists, and that following her rape and assault, 
Mrs. Tilija “reported to the police on the same day but she did 
not get any help from [the] police.”  JA 346.   Despite this new 
evidence, the BIA denied Tilija’s motion for remand and held 
that he did not present sufficient evidence to overcome the IJ’s 
determination that Tilija failed to show that the government 
was unable or unwilling to protect him.  This timely petition 
for review followed.  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The IJ had jurisdiction over Tilija’s immigration 
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  The BIA had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) and 1240.15, and 
it exercised jurisdiction over the motion to remand under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).  We have appellate jurisdiction over final 
orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
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 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for 
abuse of discretion and review underlying findings of fact for 
substantial evidence.2  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  An abuse of discretion is found where the BIA’s 
denial of a motion to remand is “arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.”  Id. (internal quotations marks omitted) 
(quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 
2002)).  “We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, but 
we accord deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1884), to its interpretation 
of statutes and regulations within its enforcement jurisdiction.”  
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted).  
  
                                                 
2 A motion to remand seeking the introduction of new evidence 
is adjudicated under the same standard for adjudicating a 
motion to reopen.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 
(3d Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4); In re Coelho, 20 I. & 
N. Dec. 464, 471 (B.I.A. 1992) (“[W]here a motion to remand 
is really in the nature of a motion to reopen or a motion to 
reconsider, it must comply with the substantive requirements 
for such motions.”).  For this reason, “motion to reopen” is also 
used in this opinion to address the legal standard utilized. 
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III. Analysis 
 Tilija raises two main issues on appeal.3  First, he 
contends that the BIA erred in failing to accept his new 
evidence as true when evaluating his prima facie claim for 
asylum relief.  Second, he argues that the BIA incorrectly 
analyzed his prima facie claim by applying the incorrect 
standard to his new evidence.  Tilija raises valid points on both 
issues, and indeed provides sufficient evidence to support a 
prima facie claim.  We will therefore grant his petition for 
review and remand for further proceedings, consistent with this 
opinion.  
A. Standard for Establishing a Prima Facie Claim for 
Asylum Relief 
 The BIA may deny a motion to remand asylum 
proceedings if it determines that (1) the movant has not 
established a prima facie claim for the relief sought, (2) the 
movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material 
evidence, or (3) in the case of discretionary relief, such as 
asylum, the movant would not be entitled to relief even if the 
                                                 
3 Petitioner also alludes to the fact that the BIA issued a 
summary opinion. Appellant’s Br. at 19 (“[T]he BIA’s opinion 
does not articulate which, if any, of these options is utilized . . 
. .”).  The BIA must perform an analysis of sufficient depth to 
permit meaningful appellate review of its reasoning and lack 
of such analysis has served as a ground to remand.  Toussant 
v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 414 (3d Cir. 2006).  Because we 
resolve this case on other grounds, we need not reach the merits 
of this argument.  
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motion was granted.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Huang, 620 F.3d 
at 389. 
 Here, only the first prong is at issue: whether Tilija’s 
new, material evidence establishes a prima facie claim for 
asylum.  To establish a prima facie claim, the movant “must 
produce objective evidence that, when considered together 
with the evidence of record, shows a reasonable likelihood that 
he is entitled to [asylum] relief.”  Huang, 620 F.3d at 389 
(citation omitted).  The BIA “must actually consider the 
evidence and argument that a party presents” and may not 
summarily dismiss the motion.  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 
260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 
542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
 To establish a “reasonable likelihood” that he is entitled 
to asylum relief, the movant must “merely show[] a realistic 
chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that 
asylum should be granted.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 
564 (3d Cir. 2004).  The movant is entitled to asylum if he 
demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecution.  See id.  To 
establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the petitioner 
must demonstrate, first, that he “has a fear of persecution . . . 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A); Huang, 620 F.3d at 380–81.  Second, 
the petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable possibility” 
that he will suffer persecution based on a protected ground if 
returned to his or her native country.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B).  Third, the petitioner must show that he 
“is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself 
of the protection of, that country because of such fear.”  Id. at 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(C).  “If an applicant demonstrates 
past persecution on account of a protected ground there is ‘a 
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rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution, as long as that fear is related to the past 
persecution.’”  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 174 
(3d Cir. 2003)). 
 The IJ found Tilija testified credibly, and that he was 
targeted on account of his political opinion.  However, the IJ 
determined that the harm Tilija suffered did not rise to level of 
persecution under the Act, and that the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Nepali government was unable or unwilling 
to protect him. 
B. The BIA Must Accept Facts Presented as True 
 The BIA must accept Tilija’s facts presented on his 
motion to remand as true.  “Facts presented in the motion to 
[remand] are ‘accepted as true unless inherently 
unbelievable.’”  Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313 (quoting Bhasin v. 
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2005)).  When Tilija 
presented letters of evidence stating his wife reported her 
attack to the police and the police did not help, the BIA did not 
accept them as true.  Instead, the BIA questioned the veracity 
of Mrs. Tilija and her friend’s statements regarding what the 
police “did or did not do” despite both letters stating the police 
did not act.  Additionally, the BIA opinion asks for “more 
details regarding [Mrs. Tilija’s] interaction with the police,” 
still not accepting the evidence as true.  JA 8.  
 Although the BIA does not need to discuss every piece 
of evidence in the record, it may not “ignore or misconstrue 
evidence in the asylum applicant’s favor,” which is what the 
BIA did with Tilija’s new evidence.  Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y 
Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2010).  The BIA does not note 
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that anything in Tilija’s new evidence is inherently 
unbelievable, therefore it must be taken as true.  When the BIA 
did not accept this evidence as true, it incorrectly applied an 
overly rigorous standard to Tilija’s new evidence. 
 We have held that not accepting evidence as true is an 
abuse of discretion if the petitioner would have established a 
prima facie case with the ignored evidence.  See Shardar, 503 
F.3d at 313.  Therefore, the next step in the analysis is 
determining whether Tilija established a prima facie case for 
asylum assuming his new evidence as true.  If Tilija has 
provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim, 
the BIA’s decision to deny his motion would lack substantial 
evidence, and therefore would be an abuse of discretion.  For 
the reasons set forth in the following section, we hold that Tilija 
does establish a prima facie case, and therefore the BIA’s 
decision to deny Tilija’s motion to remand is an abuse of 
discretion because the BIA lacked substantial evidence for its 
decision.   
C. Tilija’s New Evidence Establishes a Prima Facie Claim 
for Asylum 
 Tilija’s new evidence, accepted as true, in combination 
with his evidence in the record, establishes a prima facie 
asylum claim.  An asylum seeker need not prove his entire 
asylum case to properly assert a prima facie claim.  See Guo, 
386 F.3d at 564 (noting that prima facie “would lack meaning” 
if it required all evidence submitted at the prima facie stage to 
be able to establish eligibility for asylum).  “To establish a 
prima facie claim, the [movant] must produce objective 
evidence that, when considered together with the evidence of 
record, shows a reasonable likelihood that he is entitled to 
relief.”  Huang, 620 F.3d at 389 (citation omitted).  This means 
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Tilija must “merely show[] a realistic chance” that he “can at a 
later time establish that asylum should be granted.”  Guo, 386 
F.3d at 564.  
 With respect to asylum relief, Tilija would need to 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he possesses a well-
founded fear of persecution, which requires: (1) past 
persecution; (2) that was due to membership in a particular 
social group; and (3) the person is unable or unwilling to return 
or avail himself of the protection of his native country.  8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b).  As stated previously, in evaluating Tilija’s 
well-founded fear of persecution, the IJ determined that Tilija 
did not establish past persecution, nor that he demonstrated an 
inability to avail himself of the protections of the state.  Here, 
Tilija provides objective evidence in the form of multiple 
letters and medical reports from Nepal regarding his wife’s 
attack.  All letters attest to the fact that his wife was assaulted 
and raped, and the medical records support treatment 
consistent with such an attack.  Both Mrs. Tilija and her friend 
reported that the police were notified of the attack and did not 
act. 
 The government emphasized that the only issue was 
whether Tilija could avail himself of the protection of his 
native country.  Tilija need only provide enough evidence of 
this inability to rely on police protection to show he has a 
realistic chance to establish that his asylum claim should be 
granted at a later date.  Mrs. Tilija’s letters, taken as true, 
evince police indifference to her politically-motivated attack.   
 If Mrs. Tilija did tell the police on the same day and they 
did nothing, then it is unlikely that should Tilija himself return 
to Nepal, he would be able to avail himself of the country’s 
protection from political persecution.  The fact that Tilija’s 
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wife was attacked, and not Tilija, does not cut against his 
asylum claim because she was attacked due to his political 
beliefs.  In Shardar, we held that an affidavit from Shardar’s 
brother in Bangladesh that the brother had been recently 
threatened with a gun by a rival party to Shardar’s political 
party showed “a significant likelihood that Shardar would be 
subjected to particularized persecution” should he return to 
Bangladesh.  503 F.3d at 317.   
 We also held that medical records that confirmed his 
wounds were consistent with a beating supported the brother’s 
affidavit.  Id.  Just as the individuals who attacked Shardar’s 
brother inquired about Shardar, Mrs. Tilija’s attackers inquired 
about Tilija’s whereabouts and threatened him prior to 
attacking her, which is consistent with their prior inquiries 
regarding her husband’s whereabouts.  Additionally, third-
party medical records corroborate the nature of her attack.  Past 
persecution of family members due to the asylum seeker’s 
social groups qualify to establish persecution for the asylum 
seeker’s claim.  Id.  Therefore, Mrs. Tilija’s inability to avail 
herself of the protection of her country against political 
enemies of her husband, in connection with her attack that rises 
to the level of past persecution, satisfies the reasonable 
likelihood standard that Tilija possesses a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
D. Tilija Meets All Three Prongs to Grant His Motion to 
Remand 
 Since Tilija makes out a prima facie claim for relief, the 
BIA erred in denying his motion to remand.  The BIA may 
deny a motion to remand asylum proceedings if it determines 
that (1) the movant has not established a prima facie case for 
the relief sought, (2) the movant has not introduced previously 
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unavailable, material evidence, or (3) in the case of 
discretionary relief, such as asylum, the movant would not be 
entitled to relief even if the motion was granted.  8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c)(1).  As outlined above, Tilija’s evidence shows a 
realistic chance that he can, at a later time, establish that 
asylum should be granted.  
 In addition to failing to establish a prima facie case, the 
BIA may deny a motion to reopen (and thus remand) 
immigration proceedings if the movant has failed to introduce 
previously unavailable, material evidence that justifies 
reopening.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  Here, the government 
does not contend that Tilija’s evidence that his wife was 
attacked, raped, and reported the incident to police officers 
who did not help her, is not new, material evidence.  Instead, 
the government argues that the evidence was insufficiently 
detailed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum relief.  
As the wife’s attack occurred after the IJ’s asylum 
determination, it was impossible to provide this information 
prior to the determination.  This is not an avenue by which the 
BIA can deny Tilija’s motion to remand. 
 Lastly, in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is 
discretionary (e.g., asylum), the BIA can “leap ahead . . . over 
the two threshold concerns (prima facie case and new 
evidence) and simply determine that even if they were met, the 
movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of 
relief.”  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988); Sevoian, 290 
F.3d at 170.  Here, finding that Tilija meets his prima facie and 
new evidence threshold would require that the BIA remand his 
case.  Again, the government does not make the argument that 
he would not be entitled to discretionary relief assuming he 
meets the first two thresholds.  This is also not an avenue by 
which the BIA can deny Tilija’s motion to remand.  
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E. As a Matter of Law, Tilija Establishes a Prima Facie 
Claim 
 Our Court may also as a matter of law conclude that the 
evidence submitted by Tilija in support of his motion to 
remand constitutes prima facie evidence.  See Guo, 386 F.3d at 
564.  In Guo, we determined that not only did the BIA apply 
the incorrect standard to Guo’s evidence, it did so to the 
detriment of finding Guo had established her prima facie claim.  
Id.  Therefore, as a matter of law, we held that she provided 
enough evidence to make a prima facie showing.  Id. (noting 
“while we cannot yet say that Guo is entitled to asylum, we are 
persuaded that she at least deserves a hearing”).  The facts here 
closely mirror the facts in Guo, and the BIA similarly applied 
the incorrect standard to evidence that should have been 
considered sufficient for a prima facie claim, thus we reach the 
same conclusion.  As a matter of law, we find that Tilija has 
provided enough evidence to put forth a prima facie claim.   
IV. Conclusion 
 The Board’s rejection of Tilija’s motion to remand was 
improper.  The BIA applied the wrong standard in evaluating 
his motion to remand, failing to take his new evidence as true.  
Additionally, Tilija successfully made a prima facie claim 
under the correct standard: he presented evidence 
demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that he would prevail on 
the merits.  We will thus grant Tilija’s petition for review, hold 
that he establishes a prima facie claim, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
